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NOTES
United States v. Falvey: A Constitutionality Test for
Foreign Electronic Intelligence Surveillance
In Uni'ted States v. Falvey,I the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York dealt with the recurring issue of the interaction between
governmental activities and individual liberties. Falvey involved the issue
of whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) 2
properly balanced the need of the government to conduct foreign intelli-
gence surveillance against the rights of citizens to be free from unreason-
able governmental intrusion. The court found the FISA constitutional,
thereby approving Congress' fifth attempt 3 since Watergate to bridle the
President's inherent power to engage in warrantless electronic surveil-
lance of foreign powers and their agents.
4
In 1980, as part of an investigation of suspected terrorist organiza-
tions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed defendants Fal-
vey and Harrison, both United States citizens of Irish ancestry, under
electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA regulations. 5 Telephone con-
versations were intercepted and taped, producing evidence which the
Government stated was relevant to its criminal prosecution. 6 Thereafter,
the United States charged Falvey and Harrison with smuggling arms
and equipment to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), con-
spiracy, and numerous offenses relating to the purchase of arms and am-
munition. 7 Pursuant to FISA regulations, the Government notified the
defendants and the court of its intent to introduce relevant tapes at trial.,
The Government moved for an order that its search was lawfully author-
1 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
2 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as FISA or Act].
3 540 F. Supp. at 1311 & n.12. Prior attempts included: Foreign Intelligence Act of 1976,
S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); National Security Surveillance Act of 1975, S. 743, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Freedom from Surveillance Act of 1974, S. 4062, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); Surveillance Practices and Procedures Act of 1973, S. 2820, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
4 540 F. Supp. at 1316. This power derives from U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. I & 2, the
power to conduct foreign affairs. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876). For a
detailed history of forty years of warrantless electronic surveillance, see S. REP. No. 604, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3904, 3910-16 [here-
inafter cited as Senate Report].
5 540 F. Supp. at 1308.
6 Id.
7 Id at 1307.
8 Citing 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b), (c) (Supp. IV 1980).
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ized and conducted. 9 The defendants moved to suppress all fruits of the
surveillance' ° on the grounds that the Act violated the first, fourth, fifth,
sixth and ninth amendments and articles I and III of the United States
Constitution." The district court denied the motion to suppress and
held that FISA procedures were constitutional and were properly em-
ployed in this case.
The defendants argued that FISA permitted the government to use
politically motivated surveillance in violation of the first amendment,' 2
and that they were the targets of surveillance because the IRA was politi-
cally unpopular.' 3 The defendants further argued that FISA permitted
search and seizure based upon reasonableness requirements which were
less than those minimally guaranteed by the fourth amendment.14 Indi-
viduals targeted as agents of a foreign power, defendants continued,
should be protected by a probable cause standard equivalent to that ac-
corded individuals who are targeted as suspected criminals under Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act; 15 the general
9 540 F. Supp. at 1308. The government's motion was made pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1806(0, (g) (Supp. IV 1980).
10 540 F. Supp. at 1308. Defendants moved to suppress the tape recordings pursuant to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 106(e), 92 Stat. 1783,
1794 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e) (Supp. IV 1980)), which reads, in pertinent part, "Any
person. . . may move to suppress the evidence obtained or derived from such electronic surveil-
lance on the grounds that (1) the information was unlawfully acquired; or (2) the surveillance
was not made in conformity with an order of authorization or approval."
11 540 F. Supp. at 1308. The first, fourth, fifth and sixth amendment arguments were
addressed by the court. The ninth amendment argument was not addressed. The article I and
III arguments concerning the separation of powers doctrine were not directly addressed by the
court, but were indirectly decided. See infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
12 540 F. Supp. at 1314. The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.
13 The court summarized the defendants' argument this way:
[A]t this time the Polish labor union, Solidarity, is in; and the IRA is out. At
some future time, the roles may be reversed. But at all times, American sympa-
thizers of either group will be afraid to exercise their First Amendment rights lest
their privacy be invaded through FISA electronic surveillance.
540 F. Supp. at 1314.
14 540 F. Supp. at 1312. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
15 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82
Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This consti-
tutional argument should be distinguished from a related argument, not made in Falcy, that
"[ilssuance of a warrant based on activity that 'may' be criminal or 'may' be contrary to the
interests of the United States, depending on the target's status, permits electronic surveillance
on the basis of apossibi'y" and is thus unreasonable per se and violative of the fourth amend-
ment. See Comment, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.- Unconstitutional Warrant Criteria Permit
Wiretapping ifa Possibility ofInternatonal Terrorism is Found, 17 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 963 (1979). See
generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(l)(B), 1805(a)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
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wiretap statute.' 6 The defendants also contended that their fifth and
sixth amendment rights to counsel, to public trial, and to be present at
all proceedings against them were violated by the exparte, in camera proce-
dures of FISA.17
The court disagreed with the defendants' first amendment argu-
ment, reasoning that FISA specifically safeguarded against abusive polit-
ical surveillance by providing that no person may be considered an agent
of a foreign power solely on the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution.' 8 The court addressed the fourth
amendment issue in greater detail. Relying on United States v. United
States District Court '9 which recognized that standards of probable cause
may be "less precise" in national security investigations that in criminal
investigations,20 the court found that the FISA warrant requirements
fully comply with the reasonableness standard of the fourth amend-
ment.2' The court was unreceptive to the defendants' fifth and sixth
amendment arguments as well, pointing out the "massive body of pre-
FISA case law" which supports ex parte, in camera determinations of the
legality of electronic surveillance. 22 In addition, the court held that the
sixth amendment does not guarantee individuals the right to confront
adverse parties at pretrial suppression hearings. 23 In its reasoning, the
court focused upon FISA procedures, FISA provisions, and the pre-FISA
history of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance.
24
FISA authorizes electronic surveillance in a limited number of non-
criminal situations. To obtain a surveillance order, a federal officer must
obtain the approval of the Attorney General. The officer then submits
an application to one of seven district court judges appointed by the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The application must
detail the identity of the target; the information relied on by the Govern-
ment in its identification of the target as a foreign power or an agent of a
16 540 F. Supp. at 1313.
17 Id at 1315. The defendants cited as the offending statute 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (Supp. IV
1980), which reads, in pertinent part:
[T]he United States district court . . . shall . . . if the Attorney General files an
affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the na-
tional security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte the applica-
tion, order, and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be
necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was law-
fully authorized and conducted.
18 540 F. Supp. at 1314.
19 407 U.S. 297 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Keith, for respondent District Judge
Damon J. Keith].
20 Id. at 322.
21 540 F. Supp. at 1312.
22 Id at 1315. See, e.g., Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 316 (1969) (adversary pro-
ceedings necessary only where in camera procedures do not adequately safeguard fourth amend-
ment rights); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1980) (11 camera procedures
may adequately safeguard a defendant's fourth amendment rights).
23 540 F. Supp. at 1315, citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
24 540 F. Supp. at 1308-10.
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foreign power; 25 evidence that the place of surveillance is being used, or
is about to be used, by the foreign power or its agent; and the type of
surveillance to be used. It must also contain certification that the infor-
mation sought is foreign intelligence information. 26 Before issuing the
order, the FISA judge must make a specific finding that "there is prob-
able cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."'2 7 The judge must be
satisfied that adequate minimization procedures are proposed to protect
the target from the acquisition, retention, or dissemination of informa-
tion not related solely to national defense or foreign affairs.28 The nor-
mal period of judicially sanctioned surveillance is 90 days, but extensions
25 The phrase "foreign power or its agent" is defined at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a), (b) (Supp.
IV 1980), which provides in pertinent part:
"Foreign power" means-
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recog-
nized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of
United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or gov-
ernments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or govern-
ments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of
United States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
"Agent of a foreign power" means-
(1) any person other than a United States person, who-
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a for-
eign power, or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection
(a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in
clandestine intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the
interests of the United States, when the circumstances of such person's
presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in
such activities in the United States, or when such person knowingly aids
or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly con-
spires with any person to engage in such activities; or
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering ac-
tivities for or on behalf of a foreign power which activities involve or
may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelli-
gence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities
involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the
United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or
activities that are in preparation therefor or on behalf of a foreign
power; or
(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activi-
ties described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires
with any person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A),
(B), or (C).
26 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(l)-(a)(11) (Supp. IV 1980).
27 Id § 1805(a)(3)(A).
28 Id. § 1806(a).
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may be obtained.29 Denial of a request for a surveillance order may be
appealed to a special three-judge court of review and ultimately to the
Supreme Court. 30
Prior to FISA, neither the courts nor Congress challenged the "in-
herent" power of the President to conduct warrantless electronic surveil-
lance when grave matters involving the defense of the nation arose.3'
The Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of inherent executive power
to act in foreign affairs in United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. 32 in
1936. In Curtiss- Wright, the Court held that the president could prohibit
the sale of arms to certain foreign nations. 33 In broad language the
Court spoke of "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of inter-
national relations." 34 The Court first limited the doctrine of inherent
executive power in domestic affairs in its decision in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,35 where it held unconstitutional President Truman's
seizure of the steel mills. 36 Youngstown touches on foreign affairs issues
because the seizure was an attempt in the interests of national defense, to
prevent a steel shortage during the Korean War. In the legislative his-
tory, Congress cited Youngstown as the basis of its regulatory authority to
enact FISA.37 Congress noted that even if the President has an inherent
constitutional power to authorize warrantless surveillance for foreign in-
telligence purposes, Congress has the power to regulate the exercise of
this authority by legislating a reasonable warrant procedure governing
foreign intelligence surveillance. 38
29 Id. § 1805(d). "
30 Id § 1803(a), (b).
31 The constitutional basis for this power lies in the President's position as commander-in-
chief, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; his duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, id
§ 1, cl. 8; and his duty to speak for the nation in foreign affairs, id § 3.
32 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
33 The Court stated as follows:
It is enough to summarize by saying that, both upon principle and in accordance
with precedent, we conclude there is sufficient warrant for the broad discretion
vested in the President to determine whether the enforcement of the statute will
have a beneficial effect upon the reestablishment of peace in the affected coun-
tries;,whether, he shall make proclamations to bring the resolution into operation;
whether and when the resolution shall cease to operate and to make proclamation
accordingly; and to prescribe limitations and exceptions to which the enforce-
ment of the resolution shall be subject.
Id. at 329.
34 Id. at 319.
35 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
36 The court stated:
The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly autho-
rizes the President to take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any
act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power
can fairly be implied.
d at 585 (1951).
37 S. REP. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 & n.28, repnltedtM 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3904, 3917, 3918 n.28 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
38 Id at 3917.
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The issue of wiretapping first reached the Supreme Court in Olrn-
stead v. United States .39 In Olmstead the Court held that wiretapping was
not prohibited by the fourth amendment. Nearly forty years later, in
Katz v. United States ,40 the Supreme Court discarded the Olmstead doc-
trine and held that the fourth amendment was applicable to electronic
surveillance. 4 1 However, the Court explicitly declined to extend its hold-
ing to cover national security matters.42 Responding to the Court's ex-
plicit invitation in Katz to enact legislation, Congress passed the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 43 Title III of that Act
requires prior judicial authorization of electronic surveillance in a crimi-
nal setting, but officially disclaims any intention of legislating in the na-
tional security area. 44
Against that background the Supreme Court decided Keith 45 upon
which the judicial analysis in Falvey is closely patterned. The Keith
Court, echoing the traditional arguments for a neutral and disinterested
magistrate, concluded that the fourth amendment required prior judicial
approval in domestic security surveillance cases. 46 The Court was care-
ful to note that its decision referred only to domestic security matters:
"We have not addressed, and expressed no opinion as to, the issues which
may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their
agents."'4 7 Although the issue was narrowly drawn, the opinion inevita-
bly touched the central problem of balancing interests in national secur-
ity matters. 48
Since Keith, the Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari in
cases where appellate courts have upheld executive authority to author-
ize warrantless electronic surveillance of foreign entities within the
39 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
40 389 U.S. 347 (1967),overruhg Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). A signif-
icant intermediate case is Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 378 (1937), construing the restric-
tions on wiretapping embodied in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 as requiring the
exclusionary rule. Defendants argued for the rule in their motion to suppress in Falvey.
41 The court stated as follows:
Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in 0instead that surveil-
lance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell
outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow
view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the
Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as
well to the recording of oral statements ....
389 U.S. at 353.
42 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
43 See supra note 15.
44 The Act contained a proviso stating: "Nothing contained in this chapter . . .shall
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the nation." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3).
45 See supra note 19. Significantly, there was no dissent. Powell, J., delivered the opinion,
in which Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. 407 U.S. at 299.
Burger, C.J., concurred in the result, i. at 324. White, J., concurred in the judgement, id. at
335. Rehnquist, J., took no part in the case. Id. at 324.
46 407 U.S. at 316-17.
47 Id at 321-22.
48 Id. at 320-21.
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United States. 49 None of the appellate court cases specify the procedure
a district court should follow in determining the legality of an electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.
Congress, therefore, enacted FISA to clarify and to advance the de-
velopment of the law in an area where uncertainty existed.50  Falvey
presented questions of the constitutionality of FISA for the first time.
The decision is important for its holding that the FISA probable cause
standard 5 l fully satisfied the fourth amendment requirements as con-
strued by the Keith Court. 52 The Falvey court also made two important
assumptions. First, the Act is not an unconstitutional intrusion into the
President's power to conduct foreign affairs, and second, the Act does not
raise a nonjusticiable political question. 53
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of fourth amend-
ment standards for electronic surveillance of foreign powers and their
agents within the United States. Under Title III, an order for surveil-
lance can be signed if the judge finds "probable cause for belief that an
individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a partic-
ular offense. ' '5 4 FISA requires only that the judge find "probable cause
to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is . . . an agent of
49 United States v. Buck, 485 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1979);
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. deniedsub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419
U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974). Thus, the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have ruled on the issue whether war-
rantless foreign intelligence is constitutional. The Second Circuit has declined to take a posi-
tion. See United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1980).
50 See S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs at 3977:
The purpose of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is to provide legislative
authorization and regulation for all electronic surveillance conducted within the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes. It has long been recognized that
foreign intelligence electronic surveillance, exempted from the warrant provisions
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, could be subject to
abuse . . . . The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of Fourth
Amendment standards for electronic surveillance of foreign powers and their
agents within the United States, although the Court in the Keith case required a
judicial warrant for domestic security surveillances not involving foreign powers.
Therefore [the Senate bill currently being considered] clarifies and advances the
development of the law on a subject where uncertainty now exists.
51 FISA requires only that a judge find probable cause for belief that an individual target
is an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A). No action that is a crime under
federal or state law need be suspected. The court found that this standard provides "an effec-
tive external control on arbitrary executive action" and is a "fundamental safeguard for the
civil liberties of the individual" because a federal district court judge, not the executive branch,
makes the finding of probable cause to believe that the target of surveillance is an agent of a
foreign power. 540 F. Supp. at 1313.
52 540 F. Supp. at 1313.
53 Under the political question doctrine, courts generally refuse to decide a political issue
that by its nature is nonjusticiable under the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e.g., Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (distinguishing between lack of federal jurisdiction and nonjusti-
ciability); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-1002 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (distin-
guishing between a nonjusticiable political question and an issue not ripe for review).
54 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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a foreign power." 55 Therefore, it is significant that the Falvey court
found that departure from a criminal standard of probable cause is an
acceptable basis for investigating citizens for national security purposes.
The decision suggests that citizens who are suspected of being foreign
agents have "less precise" 56 rights under the fourth amendment than per-
sons who are accused of criminal activity. Under FISA, the term
"agency of a foreign power" includes both persons who associate with a
"foreign-based political organization" 57 and members in a "group en-
gaged in international terrorism." 58 Falvey and Harrison belonged to
the latter group. The court did not address whether the FISA standard
for probable cause will suffice for the less dangerous targets or for those
who only "aid and abet" 59 under the Act. Nor did the court address
whether activity that does not constitute a federal offense may satisfy the
national security criteria so as to warrant surveillance.
60
The Falvey court did not directly address the difficult separation of
powers issues. In Goldwater v. Carter6 | the Supreme Court found that
whether the President could terminate a treaty without the participation
of Congress presented a nonjusticiable "political question."'62 The Court
reasoned that the issue was political because it involved the authority of
the President in the conduct of foreign relations.63 The controversy, the
majority continued, should be left for resolution by the executive and
legislative branches since the Constitution is silent as to the Senate's par-
ticipation in the abrogation of a treaty.64 By carefully limiting its deci-
sion in Keith to the domestic area, the Supreme Court let stand the
assumption that regulating foreign intelligence surveillance raised polit-
ical questions Congress could not delegate to the judiciary. Therefore,
the Falvey court could have relied upon Goldwater v. Carter and Keith to
invoke the political question doctrine and refuse to decide the constitu-
tionality of FISA.
As to the Falvey court's second assumption, the courts did not review
foreign intelligence surveillance applications until Congress, with the
passage of FISA, sought specifically to curtail the claimed presidential
authority in the foreign field. Falvey signifies the judiciary's willingness
to review the constitutionality of foreign intelligence surveillance without
invoking the political question doctrine. Therefore, the court's holding
that FISA was constitutional expanded'the jurisdiction of the federal
55 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
56 See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
57 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
58 Id § 1801(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
59 Id § 1801(b)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1980).
00 See the minority view of the Senate Judiciary Committee, expressed in S. REP. No.
1035, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1976),reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3967.
61 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
62 Id. at 1003.
63 Id
64 Id
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courts in two distinct ways. First, the court decided that the Act was a
constitutional delegation of authority by Congress to the judiciary that
did not intrude upon the President's power over foreign affairs. Second,
the court decided that the judiciary may review FISA applications in
individual cases without violating the separation of powers doctrine. 65
The Falvey opinion falls short of complying with Congress' specific
intent that "for the first time in our society the clandestine intelligence
activities of our Government shall be subject to the regulation and re-
ceive the positive authority of a public law for all to inspect."' 6 6 Elec-
tronic surveillance constitutes one of the broadest forms of privacy
invasion known. 67 In 1977, the year before FISA was enacted, the aver-
age court-ordered federal wiretap intercepted 1,038 conversations be-
tween 58 persons over an average period of three weeks. 6a FISA
provisions make clear that Congress will tolerate warrantless surveillance
under only the strictest conditions. 69 Yet the Falvey opinion uses lan-
guage consonant with the more lenient pre-FISA standards. In discuss-
ing the fourth amendment, the Falvey court stated:
When, therefore, the President has, as his primary purpose, the accumu-
lation of foreign intelligence information, his exercise of Article II power
to conduct foreign affairs is not constitutionally hamstrung by the need
to obtain prior judicial approval before engaging in wiretapping.
While the executive power to conduct foreign affairs exempts the Presi-
dent from the warrant requirement when foreign surveillance is con-
ducted, the President is not entirely free of the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment. 70
An explanation for the court's reasoning may be the need to allow prior
cases to stand, and to suggest that FISA goes beyond fourth amendment
requirements. However, FISA authorizes warrantless emergency surveil-
lance only for twenty-four hours. 71 In contrast, Title III, the criminal
wiretap statute, has a much broader emergency provision with fewer pro-
cedural requisites.7 2 The court's analysis may dilute Congress' intent to
65 The prevailing view of separation of powers does not contemplate unaltcrable divisions
of functions between the three branches of government. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977).
66 See Senate Report, supra note 37, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3905-06 (quoting Attorney General Griffin Bell, testifying in favor of the bill).
67 See generally M. BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 152 (1964); M. PAULSEN, THE
PROBLEMS OF ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 12 (1977).
68 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977." Hearings on S 1566 Before the Subcomm. on
Crimihal Laws and Procedures of theJudiiag, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-92 (1977).
69 FISA waives the warrant requirement in three situations. First, no warrant is needed in
emergency situations where delay is undesirable, although a warrant must be obtained within
24 hours after the wiretapping commences. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e) (Supp. IV 1980). Second, com-
munications exclusively among foreign nations may be intercepted. Id. § 1802(a)(l)(A) (Supp.
IV 1980). Third, a warrant is not needed during the first 15 days following a Congressional
declaration of war. Id. § 1811 (Supp. IV 1980).
70 540 F. Supp. at 1311-12.
71 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
72 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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impose the restraint of prior judicial approval on the executive branch in
all but a small number of situations.
One of the most troubling constitutional issues treated by the dis-
trict court in Falvey is the question of the exparte proceeding to determine
the admissibility of FISA-obtained evidence. Upon affidavit of the At-
torney General that "an adversary hearing would harm the national se-
curity or the foreign affairs of the United States,"'73 both the defendant
and his attorney are barred from the hearing on the motion to suppress.
An in camera hearing in judicial chambers with full representation of both
parties might better achieve the balance of rights FISA seeks to establish.
Another troubling issue concerns the administration of FISA. Exec-
utive requests for surveillance authorization are rarely denied.7 4 In fact,
"[a]fter one year of the statute's operation, not one executive request for
court authorized electronic surveillance under FISA had been refused."
75
The lack of denials may be attributable to thorough executive screening
of applications. However, it may also be attributable to inadequate judi-
cial screening. The Falvey court stated that, "[d]efendants have not per-
suaded [the court] that a federal district court judge would become the
Government's tubber stamp while acting as a FISA judge, or that a
FISA judge would be any less neutral than a magistrate. ' ' 76 However,
the question remains. A FISA amendment to increase the number of
judges who may hear FISA petitions would allow greater scrutiny of each
application and would minimize the chance of undue government influ-
ence which results from the close working relationship between the panel
of judges and the intelligence community.
Whether or not the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act will sur-
vive Supreme Court scrutiny remains to be seen. The majority of the
earlier federal court decisions in the area of intelligence gathering have
centered on first and fourth amendment rights. In Falvey, the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York held that FISA struck a rea-
sonable, constitutional balance between individual constitutional rights
and the executive branch's need to monitor foreign powers and their
agents. The decision, as well as the Act, go far to clarify what has been
an unclear area of federal law.
TRACY KENYON LISCHER
73 50 U.S.C. § 1806(0 (Supp. IV 1980).
74 Note, The Foreign lnte/hgence Surveillance Act of 1978, 13 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 719, 759
(1980) (no citation to primary source).
7 5 Id.
76 540 F. Supp. at 1313 n.16.
